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The European Court and National Courts
by Francesco P. Ruggeri Laderchi1 2
Jean Victor Louis when commenting on a landmark judgment of the 
Italian Constitutional Court1 23 quoted the following phrase from the opinion of 
AG Lagrange in Costa v. Enel :
"I do not for a moment consider that Italy, which has always been in the 
forefront amongst the promoters of the European idea, the country of the 
conference of Messina and of the Treaty of Rome, cannot find a 
constitutional means of allowing the Community to live in full accordance 
with the rules created under its common charter”.
A similar kind of uneasiness would probably still be the natural reaction 
of an external observer towards the striking contradictions between the strong, 
if often illusory, Europeanism of Italian politics and the Italian people and the 
creeping mistrust of the Constitutional Court towards the supremacy of 
Community Law4 which is the leitmotif of thirty years of case law, which have 
been carefully described in Cartabia’s paper.
The search for a constitutional device by means of which the doctrines 
emanating from Luxembourg could be accepted in Italy has been more 
prolonged and difficult than AG Lagrange expected. It would be very easy to 
say that the "euro-skepticism" experienced by the Italian Constitutional Court
1 Assistant, Law Department, College of Europe, Bruges; Dottorando di Ricerca, 
Università degli Studi di Macerata.
21 am indebted to Prof. WEILER and to all the participants in the research project who 
made comments on this paper. I am particularly grateful to A.G. LA PERGOLA and 
Professor FERRARI-BRAVO for their views on the subject and to Eileen SHEEHAN for her 
invaluable help. The usual disclaimer applies.
3 Annotation to 232/75, ICIC, [1975] Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 3227.
4 One could analyze this apparent contradiction under the conceptual categories proposed 
by Weiler in " The Dual Character of Supranationalism".[1981] YEL 268 It might be a 
fascinating exercise to prove that normative supranationalism would not work in Italy because 
of the strong political supranationalist drive. It is submitted that this is probably excessive. 
It is certainly true that one of the reasons for the apparent supranationalism of Italian politics 
and of the public opinion is the fact that Community law was not taken very seriously by 



























































































paralleled the experience of other supreme courts and that according to the 
famous dictum of Lord Devlin "enthusiasm is not a judicial virtue".
However, the reasons for the attitude of the Italian Constitutional Court 
seem to a certain extent to be peculiar to it. Similarly the doctrinal construction 
that led to a qualified acceptance of direct effect and supremacy in 1984s is 
very peculiar. This paper will attempt to examine those peculiar reasons, adding 
some observations to the analysis of the law made by Cartabia. These 
observations will be based on a non doctrinal approach. To a certain extent my 
analysis will cover subjects on which Cartabia has touched upon, but the 
perspective will be different. A particular effort will be placed at taking a 
somehow external point of view, namely at describing the foundations of the 
discourse of the legal actors rather than accepting the accepted wisdom as a 
point of departure. This approach is contestable according to the standards of 
Italian legal writers but it aims at providing some further elements of reflection.
In particular I will try to look at the emergence of the doctrine of 
separation of the two legal orders in the early case-law of the Constitutional 
Court. This doctrine is an element of continuity which has characterized the 
whole development of the case law. One cannot consider the constant reference 
to it simply as some kind of fig’s leaf to cover the reversal of the Constitutional 
Court’s attitude towards community law. I will try to show that these doctrinal 
elements were so solidly entrenched in the mind of the actors of the play as to 
represent a fundamental element which explains the development of the action 
and the outcomes. A few observations will be made questioning the constant 
reference from the Constitutional Court to Granital as representing a proper 
description of the law to date. This long awaited and highly praised solution was 
probably too precious in the eyes of the Constitutional Court to be put openly 
into question.
Cartabia has correctly pointed out that the Court has not addressed the 
issue of Kompetenz Kompetenz. Nonetheless the theory of separation of legal 
orders in the case law of the Constitutional Court is based on the idea of 
competence. The debate initiated by the German Maastricht decision could pave 
the way to new developments in Italy, which will pose big theoretical and 
procedural dilemmas for the Constitutional Court. I will briefly speculate on this 
issue in my concluding remarks. 5






























































































a. The actors: judges
The "primadonna" in the play is generally acknowledged to be the 
Constitutional Court. Other courts generally did not feel in a position to accept 
the doctrines emanating from Luxembourg on their own accord. The 
Constitutional Court’s rejection of supremacy in Costa v. Enel6 placed 
Community law outside the realm of private litigants and ordinary judges. It is 
interesting to note that for more than four years7 following Costa v. Enel no 
preliminary references were made to the Court of Justice.
Presumably litigants and judges had a tendency to assimilate the procedure 
for seeking preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice to the procedure for 
judicial review of legislation by the Constitutional Court.8 As long as the 
alleged incompatibility of national law with Community law did not enable the 
former to be set aside, there was not much point in enquiring into such 
incompatibility.
The Italian administration itself was largely unaware of Community law 
and would apply it only after its transposition into administrative circulars or 
even statutes.9 *
The weight of the ordinary courts should not however be underestimated. 
In contrast to the situation in Germany, litigants do not have direct access to the 
Constitutional Court. The evolution of the case-law was prompted by the orders 
from lower courts referring matters to the Constitutional Court. Moreover, in 
order for such references to be admissible, lower courts are required to outline 
the reasons why the question submitted is relevant for the solution of the case 
at hand and demonstrate that the doubts on the constitutionality of the statute 
subject to review are not manifestly unfounded.
6 Case Costa c. Enel e soc. Edisonvolta, March 7, 1964, n. 14, Foro Italiano [1964] I,
465.
7The first 177 procedure after Costa v. Enel and Albatros (Case 20/64, judgement of 
February 4, 1965; [1965] ECR 29) which was referred on the 18 of January 1964 (before 
Costa v. ENEL) has been Salgoil which was referred by an order of July 9, 1968.
8 This could easily explain the framing of the references to the Court of Justice in terms 
such ’is the national provision xyz, compatible with article x of the Treaty?’.
9 The habit of transposing regulations into national acts was condemned by the Court of
Justice in 34/73 Variola [1973] ECR 981, and in 94/77 Zerbone [1978] ECR 99, and by the 




























































































Lower courts since the seventies have been particularly enthusiastic in 
using the procedure of preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. It is undeniable 
that the making of references to Luxembourg by Pretori'0 would feature at the 
center of the attention of the world of lawyers. Their judgments which are 
normally not reported, would be published in important law journals. The 
approval of their analysis by the Court of Justice, would demonstrate that they 
are citizens of the world and that "they get Community law right" while the 
Professors in the Constitutional Court or senior judges did not grasp the 
importance of Community Law. The quest for notoriety might be a 
psychological explanation of the attitude of lower courts.
Lower courts in a number of cases cast doubts on the validity of the 
Treaty. Sometimes those doubts were only raised in order to present the 
Constitutional Court with some of the consequences of its previous statements 
and consequently to make the case more difficult for the Constitutional Court 
and oblige it to accept certain principles of Community law.11 In other cases 
lower courts seemed eager to exacerbate the conflict between the Court in Rome 
and' the one in Luxembourg and require the Constitutional Court to defend 
certain national principles against the incoming tide of Community law.
Judicial empowerment of lower courts is a very important element of a 
non-doctrinal analysis of the reception of supremacy. The fact that orders 
making a 177 reference are not subject to appeal amplified the power of lower 
court making references as superior courts not only could not impede such 
references but would be bound by the answer coming back from Luxembourg.
However, the fundamental constitutional principle which states that courts 
other than the Constitutional Court are subject to Parliament made it impossible 
for the lower courts to accept supremacy without the endorsement of the 
Constitutional Court. Although lower courts played an important role they 
remained behind the scenes acting with the intermediation of the Constitutional 
Court and of the Court of Justice until Granital. Granital was the green light to 
lower courts to apply Community law by their own motion, which they did with 
great enthusiasm although sometimes rather imprecisely. At other times lower
10 Pretori are lower judges, often sitting in small provincial cities, who until very 
recently had extremely wide powers in both civil and criminal matters. They had a very 
important and nearly revolutionary role also in other fields of law. Judges in Italy are civil 
servants appointed following a very difficult national competitive examination at the end of 
their university studies. They form a very independent body within the State. Discipline, 
career and other organizational matters rest largely within the Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura, an independent constitutional organ whose member are appointed for two thirds 
by the judiciary and one third by Parliament.




























































































courts’ decisions reveal very deep knowledge of and reflection upon Community 
law. In the meantime they kept prompting the Constitutional Court towards 
further evolution. The overly intellectual nature of the doctrine of Granital may 
possibly explain this search for more clear cut solutions.
The absolute predominance of the Constitutional Court in the reception 
of Community law can also be explained by the lack of a doctrine of precedent 
in Italian law. It is only recently that lawyers have started studying and quoting 
in their pleadings case-law.12 The study of case-law is still exceptional in 
Italian universities. Statute books were normally not annotated with case-law. 
Even the judgments from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione were generally 
reported in extremely short abstracts prepared by a service of the Court (Ufficio 
massimario). There is no Commissaire du Gouvemement and the conclusions of 
Procuratore Generate in the Cassazione are never reported.
In contrast, the decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all 
courts. Once a statute is declared contrary to the Constitution it is as if the 
former were repealed. The Court’s case-law has over the years devised more 
sophisticated forms of judgments. It can declare that a piece of legislation is not 
contrary to the Constitution provided it is interpreted in a certain way;13 or 
even that it is contrary to the Constitution in as much as it can be interpreted in 
a certain way.14 *In a system in which -at least in theory- judges cannot make 
the law, the Constitutional Court can. One could say that the Constitutional 
Court has a true, albeit limited, legislative power.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court is much more open than other courts 
to policy arguments and even if it is at times extremely doctrinal, at least on the 
surface of its discourse, it tends to be less formalistic than other courts. This is 
not only due to its position in the system but also to the educational and 
professional background of the judges.
One third of the judges are appointed by Parliament, another third by the 
judges in the civil supreme (Cassazione) and administrative supreme (Consiglio 
di Stato, Corte dei Conti) courts and the final third by the President of the
12 Administrative law is an exception to this general rule. The Consiglio di Stato 
developed the whole construction of judicial review.
13 Ordinary courts could of course still interpret it differently, and even refer it again to 
the court on the basis of such an interpretation. This happens sometimes. The Court would 
often discard these rebel references with an order declaring the question manifestly 
unfounded.





























































































Republic.15 The judges are senior judges, lawyers and university professors. 
The particular attention that the Court pays to la doctrine is not surprising. The 
members appointed by Parliament and by the President of the Republic, often 
a law Professor himself, are mostly law professors. The post of judge of the 
Court has enormous prestige and is probably the zenith in the cursus honorum 
of a lawyer.
Decisions are discussed orally amongst the judges and drafted by the 
judge rapporteur. No dissenting opinions exist and similarly to the Court of 
Justice, all decisions are considered unanimous. The main decisions concerning 
Community law have been drafted by academics with a background in 
international law. The personal theoretical approach of the drafter is a key 
element particularly as far as obiter dicta are concerned. The influence of la 
doctrine in those judgments is even greater as counsel for the parties were often 
famous law professors who developed in their pleadings their own theories.
Another element to take into consideration is the involvement of a limited 
number of people in the handling of Community law matters. The same 
individuals were lawyers or judges in the Constitutional Court and in the Court 
of Justice.16 The Italian government has systematically designated law 
professors as judges and Advocates General in the Court of Justice. Judges of 
the Constitutional Court and of the Court of Justice come from the same milieu 
universitaire and have all given their contribution to the debate on Community 
law.
Yet another factor which has certainly played a role is the Avvocatura 
dello Stato.'1 The Italian government is in facts always represented in the Court 
of Justice by a special team in the Avvocatura dello Stato of Rome. The 
Avvocatura dello Stato of Rome also plays a very important function in 
Constitutional Court proceedings as well. This role is similar to the one of the 
Advocate General in the Court of Justice. The Avvocatura intervenes on behalf
15 This is one of the few real powers of the President under the Constitution.
16Just as an example one could note that Nicola Catalano a former Avvocato dello Stato 
was a negotiator of the Treaty of Rome, a judge in the Court of Justice, he annotated Costa 
v. Enel in the Foro Italiano (the most important law journal for practitioners) and in the 
Common Market Law Review, he pleaded in a number of cases in front of the Court of 
Justice, and he was counsel for the private parties in the Constitutional Court case 232/75 
ICIC the other Counsel for private parties in the action was Leopoldo Elia, who was going 
to be the president of the Constitutional Court at the time of Granitoi. 17
17 The Avvocatura dello Stato is a very competent and respected body which forms part 
of the Italian administration. They are lawyers, working pretty much in the same fashion as 
private lawyers, entrusted with the representation of the state in civil and administrative 




























































































of the government invariably in order to defend the legality of the statutes under 
review. The Constitutional Court takes account of these pleadings and often 
quotes them in its decisions.
b. The actors: la doctrine
Looking from a non-doctrinal point of view at the case-law one has to 
acknowledge that the main point of reference of the Constitutional Court was 
la doctrine. The public at large and the press did not pay much attention to the 
whole debate. Granital and Frontini, which were followed by a press conference 
given by the President of the Court -something extremely unusual-, were in fact 
the only occasion in which public opinion was aroused. These cases were 
perceived as "steps towards Europe", something for which there was a generic, 
yet not much reasoned, praise and favor.
Lawyers and academics, in contrast, addressed the relationship between 
the Italian legal order and the Community’s in endless debates, conferences and 
writings.18 *Simmenthal provided further stimulus towards the flowering of new 
theories. By and large la doctrine, like the Constitutional Court, found the 
supremacy of Community law per se unacceptable, at least in the terms of Costa 
v. Enel and Simmenthal, as decided by the Court of Justice. There has been 
constant attempts both by the Constitutional Court and la doctrine to make 
Community law work within the framework of generally accepted Italian 
doctrines.
It is impossible to give an account of the different theories. If one reads 
the first commentaries on Costa v. ENEL one realizes that there were already a 
dozen or more different theories proposed by academics in order to solve the 
divergence between Rome and Luxembourg. When looking back over thirty 
years of debate it is very arbitrary to refer to specific contributions. Nonetheless 
there are certain approaches that are common to several authors. It is therefore 
still useful to refer to them.
It is not very difficult to conclude that the fact that the authors of these 
theories had a background of international or constitutional law played a certain 
role. The former would dilute Community law in international law while the 
latter would rely mainly on the constitutional rules granting supremacy, thus 
recognizing supremacy only because of these rules.
As an example of the first approach one could look at the first pages of
18 Just to have a sample of the quantity of theories one could look at the authors quoted
by P. De Caterini in his note to Frontini in [1975] Cahier de Droit Européen, 115. After




























































































one of the most widely used Community law handbooks:19
"The insufficiency of this approach [i.e. Community law as an 
autonomous body of law] to define scientifically ’community law’ does 
not need a specific demonstration, in the light of the consideration that the 
legal phenomenon of the Community has its basis and its discipline in a 
set of norms belonging to international law and that the Community can 
only be seen as a part of international law".
Further:
"In this respect the statements of the Court of Justice in Van Gend & 
Loos and Costa v. ENEL are not convincing when they affirm that the 
EEC Treaty is more ’than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states’ and that it would be different 
from ’ordinary international treaties’. The EEC Treaty [..] on the contrary 
is an international treaty like any other, and it only creates a series of 
rights and obligations between the contracting states [..]".
These kind of statements are not uncommon. They do not mean that the 
authors do not acknowledge supremacy, but simply that they would prefer the 
supremacy of EC law to fall within the framework of the general international 
law principle of supremacy of treaties and they would rather stress the 
traditional principle of interpretation conforme or other rules of construction20 
in order to avoid conflicts between domestic provisions and Community 
provisions.
A role has also been played by the set of theories based on article 10 of 
the Constitution.21 *These theories were put forward by international lawyers 
and have never been accepted. Due to their intellectual fascination and to the 
prestige of Rolando Quadri, their main advocate, everybody felt obliged to 
discuss them even if only in order to discard them later. The Corte di 
Cassazione and the Constitutional Court discarded them only in Frontini. These 
theories when compared to the ’soft monism’ of other international lawyers can
19 F. Pocar, Diritto delle Comunità Europee, 4th ed. Milan, 1991, 2-3.
20 B. Conforti, another important international lawyer, stressed the fact that rules of 
Community law are special in relation to ordinary statutes. Hence conflicts should be solved 
with the mie of interpretation lex specialis derogai generali. See lastly Diritto Intemazionale, 
3rd, Napoli, 1987.
21 Which reads as follows:" The Italian legal order conforms with the generally recognized




























































































be seen as a radical form of monism. If Italy had accepted this approach it 
would have adopted a very similar if not more radical position towards 
Community law than the Netherlands.
Rolando Quadri’s theory roughly goes as follows. Art. 10 incorporates by 
reference general international law into the Italian legal system. The most 
important rule of general international law is pacta sunt servanda. Treaties are 
therefore incorporated into the national legal order. This theory was not however 
specifically elaborated in relation to Community law. Quadri himself adapted it 
to Community law stressing that the rules incorporated by art. 10 would have 
supremacy over ordinary legislation. The rejection of this approach which 
appeared to most authors and presumably to the Constitutional Court as an 
unrealistic intellectual game and as using ’a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ is 
symptomatic of how deeply rooted dualism is in the Italian legal culture.
On the other hand one can see those authors who were more influenced 
by Constitutional law. Their position was closer to the position of the Court. 
Cartabia has pointed to the role played by the theories of Federico Sorrentino 
who is a professor of constitutional law. It is probably worth mentioning the role 
of the theories of Antonio La Pergola. When referring to his book22 published 
in 1961, but written earlier, one would find much of what is said in the 
subsequent case-law, and indeed in Granital which was drafted by La Pergola 
himself. He very much developed the concept of the ’atypical sources of law’ 
in relation to the acts reproducing rules of international law in the internal legal 
order. "Atypical sources of law" are ordinary acts which because of some 
specific constitutional guarantee cannot be modified by other ordinary acts. 
Although the whole theory is dualist La Pergola emphasized the practical 
irrelevance of choosing between monism and dualism.
The Constitutional Court never uses the term ’dualism’ which seems to 
have some kind of negative and provincial flavor. It rather relies on the theory 
of the plurality of legal orders.23 This theory is well established in Italian 
Constitutional law tradition. Even if it can be traced back to the ’Republic’ of 
Plato, it finds its main expression in the writings of Santi Romano. This 
reference remains mainly an attempt to grant cultural nobility to the dualist 
approach.
Dualism after all is too entrenched in the Italian legal tradition to be
22 A. La Pergola, Costituzione e adattamento dell’ordinamento interno al diritto 
intemazionale, Milano, 1961.
23In case 168/91 Giampaoli (.infra) the Court while restating Granital literally said "the 
fundamental principle (inspired by the doctrine of the plurality of legal orders) according to 





























































































abandoned and is linked with the fundamental doctrinal and political concern to 
avoid a shifting of ’grundnorm’.
On the other hand most people sooner or later realized that the contrast 
between the Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court on the status of 
Community Law in Italy were unsustainable. Legal certainty has a very 
appealing quality for every lawyer and the contrast between the courts far from 
enhanced legal certainty. La doctrine shared the same concerns and the same 
Weltanschauung as the Constitutional Court and suggested, discussed and 
invented solutions, with a fervor that probably was not matched in any other 
country.
Looking back at the case-law it is still worth repeating what a very 
influential commentator wrote in a note to Granital:
"[.. The Constitutional Court] was obliged to negotiate a path between the 
inflexibility of the legal rules; the requirements of the process of 
integration, [..] the more or less discrete pressure from the Community 
Institutions, [..] the behavior of the legislature and of the administration 
often incoherent and sometimes schizophrenic and in striking 
contradiction between a ’labial’ Europeanism in permanent service and 
a different if not opposed behavior; the contrasting stimuli of a strongly 
involved doctrine, divided, unstable, verbose and maybe even confusing 
for the unbelievable quantity and variety of solutions imagined and
* m 2 4reasons given.
c. Cross Fertilization
The experience of other countries and of Germany in particular has been 
very important for the Constitutional Court. The influence was important both 
at the doctrinal level and at the judicial policy level.
La doctrine has always been very open in every field of law to foreign 
models. In the nineteenth century the French model was absolutely dominant. 
This is quite understandable as the Italian civil code was little more than a 
translation of the Napoleon code. Nonetheless German doctrine later became 
extremely influential. The ’Begriffe Jurisprudenz’ first influenced Roman and 
in Civil law studies then became the model to which all Italian academics tried 
to conform in every field of legal studies. Despite the fact that the knowledge 
of the German language was not generally widespread it became a necessary 24
24 A. Tizzano, "La Corte costituzionale ed il diritto comunitario: vent’anni dopo...",[1984] 




























































































tool for any respectful academic. The footnotes to every classic civil or public 
law handbook often quote more German than Italian authors.
The shift away from the French to the German model, particularly evident 
in the civil code of 1942, has been carefully studied by comparative lawyers 
with particular attention to private law. The attention to German model in the 
field of public law was possibly even more marked. It is probably more 
common to find references to Jellineck and Laband in Italian text-books than in 
German ones. The Weimar Constitution was a very influential model in the 
drafting of the Italian Constitution. The fact that Italy and Germany were the 
only two founding Member states of the Community to have a Constitutional 
Court, ensured that it was natural for both la doctrine and the Court to look 
carefully to the German solutions.
The Court certainly found in the Solange case-law support for the limits 
to Community law for protection of Human rights that were set in Frontini. In 
the beginning these limits, it is submitted, had more to do with theoretical 
worries than with actual problems in the application of Community law in Italy. 
The fact that the whole question of Human rights was so relevant in Germany 
was a very compelling reason for retaining these limits in Italy as well.
The importance of German examples is openly revealed in Granital, 
where the Constitutional Court itself acknowledges that one of the reasons for 
accepting the decentralized control of conformity of legislative acts with 
Community law was the fact that this type of control was accepted everywhere 
including Germany.
Other influences can also be found in different respects. Granital or at 
least its discourse, is based on the idea of ’pre-emption'. The influence of 
American federal doctrines is not totally extraneous to this approach.
In a different manner one could also see some kind of cross-fertilisation 
between the Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court could not be unaware of the dimensions of the conflict and was very 
careful whenever it entered the mined field of the relationship between national 
and Community law. This attention became of course more evident in the post- 
Granital case-law. It has already been pointed out that the two courts were 
acting in the same milieu. It is submitted that the parallelism between the 
Constitutional Court case Bolzano25 and Court of Justice case Flli Costanzo,25 6 
to which Cartabia has referred, for instance, was far from being accidental.
At a later stage the Constitutional Court even tried to "steer" the case-law
25 369/89 Provincia di Bolzano, [ 1990] Diritto Comunitario e degli scambi intemazionali
395.




























































































of the Court of Justice. The signal that was sent up with the Fragd27 decision 
is very symptomatic.
In contrast, in minor cases, which were not perceived to contain large 
Constitutional issues, the Constitutional Court did not only appear to forget the 
complicated doctrines that it devised in the grands arrêts, but at times 
misinterpreted Community law. It is possible to find obiter dicta, and at times 
actual decisions, completely at variance with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice. In this respect the refusal to use the procedure for preliminary rulings 
to the Court of Justice becomes particularly regrettable.
The above mentioned peculiarities of the Italian legal system are of course 
too simplistic to be ’explanations’ of the story that Cartabia has described in 
detail. They are merely elements which from within the system seem too trivial 
to be taken into consideration. Looking at the system from outside however, 
they are necessary factors in order to make sense of the Constitutional Court’s 
case-law and to limit, at least to a certain extent, the puzzled unease that AG 
Lagrange, Jean Victor Louis and many other external observers experienced 
when faced with the Italian rebellion to Community law.
In the light of the foregoing it might be useful to go back to the history 
of the story and see how the elements just mentioned played a role.
LOOKING BACK AT THE ’COMMUNITY PATH’ OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
a. The origin of the constitutional Court’s doctrines: a device used in 
order not to declare the Treaty contrary to the Constitution
i. The background
Bruno de Witte has correctly pointed out that national courts when 
confronted with Community Law had to face problems of different kinds. Only 
once the national courts had accepted that the Treaties had been lawfully ratified 
(Membership) could they proceed to examine the effects of the Treaties and to 
solve the conflicts between the Treaties and national legislation (the supremacy 
direct effect cluster).
This distinction is particularly true for the Italian Constitutional Court. 
The distinction between the different types of problems, is more logical than 
chronological. It is however undeniable that the solutions given to the problems




























































































of direct effect and supremacy and the choice of procedural means for granting 
supremacy have been influenced -nearly determined in hereditary manner- by 
the choices and the compromises made in order to accept the constitutional 
legality of the membership to the Communities.
The dualist constitutional orthodoxy and a plain reading of the 
Constitution seem to offer very little support to the legality under Italian 
Constitutional law of the Community Treaties.
Treaties, like any other rule which is not created by the constitutional 
organs endowed with the power to create such rules, do not have any effect per 
se in the national legal order. It is a national act that either by reproducing them 
or by referring to them gives them effect. As Parliament cannot modify the 
Constitution by ordinary statute, it cannot ratify and implement by statute 
treaties which result in a modification of the Constitution, unless some express 
rule in the Constitution grants this power.
The Constitution of 1947 was a compromise, and to a certain degree the 
last compromise, between all the political forces that succeeded to power 
following the collapse of the fascist regime. Later however, major choices, 
especially with regard to foreign policy and the inclusion of Italy in the Western 
block, were made in the face of opposition from the strongest Communist party 
in Western Europe.
A so called constitutional statute ("legge costituzionale"), having the same 
force as the Constitution and hence the force to derogate from the latter, could 
not be passed in Parliament in order to implement the Community Treaties as 
it would had been impossible to achieve the required two thirds majority of 
votes. It might seem banal, but all the theories and the Court’s doctrines devised 
in order to affirm the legality of the statutes implementing the Treaties, are 
merely means to avoid the consequences of the original sin of not having used 
the special procedure of revision of the Constitution when implementing the 
Treaties.
One should keep in mind that the Constitutional Court was not even in 
place at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris. Ordinary judges 
and the administration were to a large extent unacquainted with the idea of the 
supremacy of the Constitution over ordinary statutes. The Constitutional Court, 
once established in 1956, had to fight a long struggle to give effect to many 
principles of the Constitution that had been considered as merely ’programmatic’ 
as opposed to rules in the constitution having binding effect.
One could be forgiven for thinking that at the time of ratification of the 
Treaties, the -probably well founded- doubts as to the legality of the means (an 
ordinary statute passed in Parliament) used to give effect to them, were merely 
some kind doctrinal formalism. Nobody could seriously have imagined the 




























































































ii. A difficult start
A legal realist, at the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, would 
never have predicted that any court on the basis of the Treaties founding the 
common market could have prevented Parliament from proceeding to the 
nationalization of the electric industry. Nationalization of the industry was an 
enormous political issue and amounted to a major societal choice. It was 
perceived as a step towards a new economic model, refusing -to a certain extent- 
capitalism and was the result of a significant political shift.
In Costa v. Enel the Constitutional Court was not directly faced with the 
issue of the legality of the Treaties. The judge Conciliatore, when ruling on a 
cleverly ’invented’ case,28 assumed a) that the Treaty of Rome was properly 
ratified and executed by means of a statute, b) that a statute contrary to the 
Treaty would be unconstitutional.
It is well known that the Constitutional Court declared that indeed the 
State is bound by the Treaties but only as a subject of the international legal 
order. A statute contrary to the Treaties would hence be considered as a 
violation of international law but would not lose its value as a statute. The 
Constitutional Court noted that art. 1129 only means "that under certain 
conditions, it is possible to enter into agreements which limit sovereignty, and 
that it is possible to implement them by an ordinary statute”. However "[..] art. 
11 has not given to the ordinary statute that implements the Treaty a superior 
effect to the one of any other statute".
To a certain extent the Italian Government itself caused the bold reaction 
of the Court of Justice in Costa. The case that came to the Court of Justice was 
not technically speaking the same that went to Rome, it was in fact a case 
pending before a different Conciliatore. The Italian Government nonetheless, 
relied on the decision of the Constitutional Court in order to argue the 
inadmissibility of the 177 reference. It was argued that the questions were 
irrelevant insofar the national judge was bound to apply the statute creating 
ENEL and not the Treaty which was enacted previously. The Court of Justice 
prompted by AG Lagrange reacted in -by now well known- words to that plea.
28 L. Ferrari Bravo "L’issue de l’affaire Costa c. ENEL devant le Conciliatore de Milan", 
[1967] Cahier de Droit Européen, 194.
29 Which reads as follows:
"Italy condemns war as an instrument of aggression against the liberties of other 
peoples and as means for settling international controversies; it agrees on conditions 
of equality with other states, to such limitation of sovereignty as may be necessary for 
a system designed to ensure peace between Nations: it promotes and encourages 




























































































However, in Albatros, which was decided immediately thereafter, the 
Court of Justice seemingly took a more cautious approach. Perhaps to avoid 
further frontal clashes with national jurisdictions or perhaps because the French 
government did not introduce arguments of the type used by the Italian 
government. The Court of Justice merely interpreted some articles of the Treaty 
without dealing with their effects on the subsequent French legislation in 
question.
It is commonplace to stigmatize the solution chosen by the Constitutional 
Court and to compare it to the one proposed by the Court of Justice as a 
reaction to it. What is certain is that the judgment of the Constitutional Court 
was hasty30 and formalistic. One has the impression that the Court was not 
really interested in the process of European integration and was very annoyed 
at having to deal with something so important as the annulment of the 
nationalization of electricity industry as requested by Mr Costa in order not to 
pay an electricity bill of 1925 Liras (Little more than one dollar at today’s rate).
It has however to be noted that at the time the legal situation was not so 
clear cut at the Community level either in relation to the effects of the 
Community obligations. It was often argued at the time that art. 5 of the Treaty 
showed that it rested upon the Member States to ensure the conformity of their 
legislation with Community law.31
Even the recognition of the legality of the Treaty on the basis of art. 11 
was far from being a forgone conclusion. The article is drafted in very different 
terms both from art. 55 of the French constitution and from art. 24 of the 
German basic law. It was argued that art. 11 was drafted in order to enable Italy 
to adhere to the UN and that it could not be recycled and made applicable to the 
Community. Some authors claimed that it was merely programmatic and 
deprived of any legal value. Very respected and influential writers were still 
calling for the use of art. 10 as a peg on which to hang Community law 
(Quadri’s theory).
The applicability of art. 11 to the Community Treaties, as to enable their 
valid ratification and implementation by ordinary statute was ascribed to 
Perassi.32 *During parliamentary discussions on the act of ratification of the 
ECSC Treaty the rapporteur (Ambrosini) referred to art. 11 in order to counter 
the objections of those requesting the use of a special ’constitutional statute’. It
30 The Court calls the Commission 'ad hoc Commission’ or ’Consultative Commission’ 
and the Court of Justice ’High Court of Justice’.
31 This was argued by the Italian Government in the Court of Justice in Costa v. ENEL.





























































































was in fact Nicola Catalano that placed more emphasis than any other on art. 11. 
He remained nonetheless extremely critical of the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court.33 To his mind art. 11 should have been interpreted so as to grant 
supremacy.
iii. Further steps. San Michele and the adoption of the theory of 
separation of legal orders.
The legality of Membership to the Community in Costa v. ENEL 
remained an obiter dictum. The very limited effect that the Constitutional Court 
reasoning gave to art. 11 left many questions open in respect of the legality of 
the Treaties. Private parties therefore, tried to contest the legality of the treaties, 
in particular the legality of the Coal and Steel Treaty in order to challenge, in 
the Italian courts, penalties imposed within the framework of the latter.34 Some 
courts35 in the wake of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Costa v. 
ENEL were able to discard the argument with a generic reference to art. 11 of 
the Constitution, while others went on to assess the legality of the provisions of 
the Treaties.36
The tribunal of Turin on the 19 of December 196437 made a reference 
to the Constitutional Court.lt expressed doubts both as to the legality of an 
ordinary statute as the basis for Membership and as to the compatibility with art. 
102 and 1 1338 *of the Constitution of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice in the annulment and suspension of decisions of the High Authority. The 
tribunal, on the basis of the statement in Costa in accordance to which art. 11 
did not give any specific value to the rules deriving from the Treaty, argued that 
these rules could not validly derogate from the above mentioned articles of the
33 See his annotation to Costa v. Enel in [1964] Foro Italiano 1,465; [1965] CMLRev.
34 E.g. Tribunale di Napoli, April 22, 1964, Società Metallurgica di Napoli s.p.a. c. 
CECA, Rivista di diritto Intemazionale Privato e Processuale [1965] 110; Tribunale di Roma, 
September 22, 1964, S.p.a. Acciaierie ferriere di Roma c. CECA, ibid., 116; Tribunale di 
Milano, September 28, 1964, S.p.a. Meroni c. CECA, ibid., 121.
35 Pretura di Roma, order of March 11, 1964, Giustizia civile [1964] III, 130.
36 Cases quoted supra, n° 32.
37 The order is published in [1965] Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale,
126.






























































































The case San Michele was another step in a long saga that saw a number 
of Italian iron scrap users contesting in two occasions, without success, High 
Authority decisions before the Court of Justice.39 The Constitutional Court in 
its decision40 *assessed ex professo the legality of the Treaties and established 
a framework of reference for the subsequent case-law. The Constitutional Court 
did not follow the suggestions of the parties to the main proceedings, which 
requested a general review of the conformity of the Treaty with the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court referred to Costa in order to show that art. 11 
authorized Membership.
The Constitutional Court firstly said that the constitutional guarantees 
deriving from the above mentioned articles applied only to individuals as part 
of the domestic legal order. It continued by stating that the Treaty, which 
involved more states formed a completely separate legal order. The Court further 
stated that the domestic legal order did not incorporate the Community legal 
order. The domestic legal order only recognized the international co-operation 
that is within the aims of the Community. Finally the domestic legal order 
determined the cases in which the activity of the organs of the Community, 
within their respective competence, had internal effects. The determination of 
the internal legal effects had to take into account the inviolable principle of 
judicial protection.
The Constitutional Court finally decided that the prohibition in article 104 
of the Constitution on the establishment of special courts is valid only in 
connection with the domestic legal order and cannot be applied to the organs of 
the ECSC because they are part of a ’separate legal orbit’ and are not subject 
to the sovereign powers of the Member states. The Constitutional Court went on 
nonetheless to decide that the rules of the Community were not in breach of the 
principle of judicial protection.
The dictum  of the case is not extremely clear and looks very much to be 
a compromise. It is clear that the Constitutional Court refused to evaluate en 
bloc the legality of the statute implementing the Treaty. It stated that it would 
check only the compatibility of specific rules with the Constitution. Art. 11 was 
hence definitely established as a valid legal basis for Membership of the 
Communities. It was not clear however to what extent art. 11 enabled the Treaty 
to derogate from the other substantive provisions of the Constitution.
19 Joined cases 5 to 11 and 13 to 15/62 San Michele and others v. High Authority [1962] 
ECR 449 and Joined cases 2/63 to 10/63 San Michele and others v. High Authority [1963]
ECR 327.
40 27/12/65 n° 98 Acciaierie S. Michele c. CECA, [1966] Rivista di diritto Intemazionale




























































































The fundamental result of this case is the adoption of the theory of 
separation of the two legal orders. The theory was used mainly as a device in 
order not to apply the specific rules of the Constitution to the organs of the 
Community. The subsequent case-law built upon this legal device.
One could try to read more in this case. In its theory of separation of the 
two legal orders the Constitutional Court seemingly hints to the idea of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The effects of the activities of the organs of the 
Community are recognized in the internal order only within the limits of their 
sphere of competence. On top of this, before having effect in the internal order, 
Community acts should comply with human rights.
As a final remark about San Michele it is interesting to note that the 
Community was a party to the main proceedings and submitted observations to 
the Constitutional Court. In its observations the High Authority stressed that 
article 11 was the legal basis not only for Membership but also for supremacy. 
Prof. Giuliano,41 counsel for the Community, had already adhered to Catalano’s 
theories. The Avvocatura while recognizing the legality of Membership through 
art. 11 sustained the theory of the separation.
iv. The first in depth analysis: Frontini
It is well known that it was only in Frontini42 that the Constitutional 
Court tried to spell out the principles contained in San Michele. For the first 
time the Constitutional Court ventured into a detailed analysis of the Community 
legal order. The tone rather than the theoretical framework is radically different 
from the previous decisions.
In their orders for reference to the Constitutional Court the Tribunal of 
Turin and Genoa contested the legality of the legislative power of the 
Community. The Constitutional Court declared that art. 11 not only authorized 
Membership but that in order not to deprive art. 11 of any significance it should 
be interpreted as allowing the Treaties to derogate from the Constitution without 
recourse to the special procedure of amendment. It went on to analyze the 
Community system proving that it complied with the conditions of art. 11.
In Frontini as in San Michele, the Constitutional Court on the one hand 
says that the provisions of the Italian Constitution are not applicable to the 
Community legal order and on the other hand it still goes on to demonstrate that
41 "Droit communautaire et droit interne des Etats membres" [1966] Rivista diritto 
intemazionale privato e processuale, 220. 42
42 27/12/73 Frontini e altro c. Ministero delle Finanze, [1974] Rivista di diritto 




























































































the Community legal order offers analogous guarantees. If the theory of the 
separation of the orders is formally the ratio of these cases, it is clear that the 
Constitutional Court needed some policy arguments on which to base its 
judgment and it was convinced only by them.
Moreover, while addressing the alleged violation of the principle of 
judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution the Constitutional Court does 
not even use the theory of separation but rather demonstrates that the 
Community system offers an equivalent level of protection.
The recognition of the direct effect of regulations43 was used to counter 
an objection raised by the Avvocatura which claimed that the regulations in 
question could not be applied by the judges in the main proceedings as they 
were bound to apply the subsequent national legislation reproducing them. This 
recognition was based once again on the doctrine of separation of the two legal 
orders. The distinct legal orders are nonetheless co-ordinated according to the 
distribution of competences guaranteed by the Treaty. The State, having limited 
its sovereignty, could no longer intervene in the sphere of competence of the 
Community.
The famous reservation on human rights seems to have been made ad 
abundatiam. On the one hand the Constitutional Court says that the legislative 
competence of the Community is limited to economic relations and on the other 
hand that there are rules in the Treaty which guarantee that Community law will 
not conflict with the Constitution in the area of civil and political rights. 
Nonetheless if art. 189 of the Treaty of Rome was to be interpreted as allowing 
the Community to trespass in this area the acts adopted on the basis of such an 
interpretation would be outside the scope of the limitations of sovereignty 
allowed by art. 11.
This reservation was prompted by la doctrine. The so called counter­
limits, that is to say the limits to the limitations of sovereignty, are material 
rules prohibiting the Community from violating human rights and the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court bases its 
reasoning on the fact that the limitations on sovereignty are allowed only for the 
aims of art. 11 and that the Treaty sets out concretely the limitations on national 
sovereignty.
The language used is the language of competence. In the decision the 
Constitutional Court noted that the legislative power of the Community is based 
on the precise allocation of competences. This construction which is the most 
persistent element in the evolution of the case-law, does not make things very 
clear in practice. The Treaty as a matter of fact establishes an allocation of
43 The order of the Tribunal of Genoa was in fact contesting the legality of the regulations 




























































































competences that is far from clear and in many areas the Member States and the 
Community have concurrent competences. The doctrine of the Constitutional 
Court has been interpreted practically as meaning wherever there is a piece of 
Community law it has precedence because it is in the Community sphere of 
competence.
The possibility that an act of the Community would be beyond the 
Community competence seemed in Frontini merely theoretical. The reservation 
is expressed in a short paragraph without much reasoning. Two different 
approaches are confused. The Constitutional Court when referring to the fact 
that the Treaty deals only with economic questions and does not interfere with 
political rights is referring, although quite roughly, to a real problem of 
competence; while by framing the limit of human rights in the same terms the 
Constitutional Court irremediably confuses the matters.
b. From Frontini to Granital: few remarks
i. The centralized control
It is well known that the doctrine of the separation of the legal orders and 
the acceptance of supremacy and direct effect in Frontini were not a solution for 
all the problems. It was not outlined what the judge should do when faced with 
a clash between Community legislation and subsequent domestic provisions.
The 7C/C44 case-law and the choice of centralizing enforcement in the 
hands of the Constitutional Court was a solution which was not only approved 
by a large section of la doctrine but seemed to many authors to be compatible 
with Community Law and the principle of Institutional autonomy of Member 
states. It had the enormous advantage of coming squarely within the accepted 
doctrines on the Constitutional system.
The Constitutional Court has continuously tried to systematize its case- 
law. The whole system of "atypical sources" and the possibility of declaring a 
statute unconstitutional for breach of rules incorporated by reference by the 
Constitution is rather common. The review of constitutionality of statutes for 
indirect breach of the Constitution is a device used, inter alia, in relation to 
statutory instruments in breach of the authorizing statute, for regional statutes 
in breach of national framework statutes and in all kinds of other instances. The 
ICIC doctrine put Community law in a similar, if not identical, constitutional 
position to the position of the agreement between the Catholic Church and the 
State and in a partially analogous position to the position of the agreements with 
other Churches. Community Law would have the same constitutional position




























































































of international treaties on the treatment of non-nationals and so on.
The reaction of the Court of Justice in Simmenthal to supremacy 
’all’italiana’, was perceived in Italy by the majority of la doctrine as an abusive 
interference in the procedural autonomy of Member States. The Tribunal of 
Milan put the Constitutional Court in a very difficult position when it required 
it to declare the Treaty contrary to the Constitution in so far as Community law, 
as interpreted in Simmenthal, would be contrary to the fundamental principles 
of the Constitution.45
The Tribunal of Milan was basically requiring the Constitutional Court 
either to accept Simmenthal and the decentralized control or to take a clear 
position against it. The Constitutional Court found a very clever escape route by 
stating that in the pending case there was no clash between domestic and 
Community law, and hence the question was irrelevant.
To make such a dilatory decision the Constitutional Court took nearly 
three years. To take a clear position on the issue in the case of Granital the 
Constitutional Court took nearly five years. This is a hint of the conflicts in the 
Constitutional Court and the difficulties involved by the acceptance of 
decentralized enforcement of Community law. Granital presented itself to the 
Constitutional Court as the ideal case for the reversal of the previous case-law. 
It was the State which invoked Community law against a statute.
It is clear that the Constitutional Court wanted to terminate the conflict 
with the Court of Justice. The policy reasons for accepting the change are set 
out quite overtly in the decision. The conflict with the Court of Justice was 
unsustainable. The fact that in all the other Member states of the Community a 
satisfactory solution was found was clearly a further stimulus. Docket control 
reasons should not be forgotten. Constitutional Court proceedings are long and 
cumbersome. The Constitutional Court had an enormous back-load of cases 
since the seventies. Leaving lower Courts to deal with Community law would 
make things easier. Even if the solution of the conflict was very much sought 
after the Constitutional Court had to find a way to do it. As the drafter of the 
judgment once said ’One does not divorce only because his wife spends too 
much’.
Simmenthal required to move away from the doctrine of ICIC. That 
scheme, after all, meant that Community law had supremacy because of article 
11 of the Constitution. The ICIC doctrine was in fact the supremacy of art. 11. 
However, the reasons for which the Constitutional Court could not accept, in 
ICIC, the supremacy of EC law per se, were still there.
There were two main obstacles to this acceptance. The first is that if one 
were to consider -as the Constitutional Court did- the conflicts between domestic




























































































and Community Law as a conflict of competence and not as a hierarchical 
conflict of norms it would follow that domestic provisions in breach of 
Community law would only be in breach of the superior rule that defines the 
respective spheres of competence of the domestic and of the Community 
legislature. This superior rule is art. 11. The conflict between statutes and rules 
in the Constitution -like art. 11- can be solved only by the Constitutional Court.
Beyond the doctrinal concern derived from the theoretic dualist model 
there is a more fundamental one. The acceptance of the superiority of 
Community law per se would have meant accepting a shifting of the grundnorm. 
The Court felt that it was impossible to accept such a change as a result of the 
signing of the Treaty or even worse as a result of doctrines emanating from the 
Court of Justice.
The main result of Granital is showing that it was conceptually possible 
to solve the problem of supremacy without giving up the doctrine of Frontini. 
The effort to show that nothing much was changing is very evident throughout 
the whole judgment. It is clear that this was meant to obtain a consensus within 
the Constitutional Court. But it is more than that. The effort to stick to the 
model of separation and to show that the power of every judge not to apply 
domestic provisions conflicting with Community law was the logic consequence 
of Frontini is the response to the two above mentioned fundamental concerns 
of the Constitutional Court.
Granital can be defined as direct effect without supremacy. The 
Constitutional Court pointed out in Granital, and repeated forcefully in 
Giampaoli,46 that the judge who applies Community law and does not apply 
the conflicting national provisions is not qualifying the national provisions as 
unconstitutional or void due to a trespass on the Community competence. The 
judge only applies Community law within its sphere. The conflicting domestic 
provisions are in another sphere.
The division of spheres of competence is established by the statute 
implementing the Treaty and granted by art. 11. This can explain the reservation 
of jurisdiction against statutes designed to attack the core principles of 
Community law. The Court seemingly considered that whenever Parliament 
changed the boundaries of the spheres of competence as established by the 
statute implementing the Treaty, the problem cannot be solved anymore by a 
reference to the respective spheres of competence. The only criterion for 
deciding on the legality of a ’denunciation’ of the Treaties is the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court considers the power to remove the limits to sovereignty 
the bottom line of sovereignty. Renouncing it would have been a change of 
grundnorm: a revolution.




























































































With Granital the Court considered that the conflict with the Court of 
Justice was solved and in the process a revolution was avoided. The Court was 
cheating when it said that the results of its new doctrines coincided with the 
requirements set by the Court of Justice. What was probably true is that they 
wanted the conflict to be solved once and for all.
SKETCHY OBSERVATIONS ON THE POST -GRANITAL CASE-LAW
It is submitted that there are at least three strands in the post Granital 
case-law that has been described in detail in Cartabia’s Paper. In one way or 
another they all depart from the nice construction of Granital.
a) Some cases extend the scope of the Granital doctrine. In doing so, the 
Court, especially in the cases that are perceived as being important, redefines in 
long obiter dicta the whole scheme of the relationship between the two legal 
orders. The Constitutional Court claims that its case-law is a mere application 
of Granital. But it extends its scope47 and at times comes out with solution 
hardly compatible with the Community law orthodoxy, if not in the result in the 
reasoning.
As an example the Constitutional Court stated that the rulings of the ECJ 
have direct effect48 or that it is possible to legislate (through a referendum)49 
against Community directives in consideration of the fact, that, given the 
directives direct effect, the legislation would be inapplicable.
However, this line of case-law remains the most coherent even in the 
cases in which the clash with the Court of Justice is deliberate, as it was in 
Fragd.50 The "pouvoir réservé" that the Court retained is some kind of security
47 This extension has avoided many of the inconsistencies of a strict reading of Granital 
with the requirements set by the ECJ. For a very convincing analysis of these inconsistencies 
see BARAV "Cour Constitutionnelle Italienne et Droit Communautaire: le fantôme de 
Simmenthal", [1985] Revue trimestrielle de droit Européen, 313.
48 1 13/85 BECA, [1985] Giurisprudenza Italiana 388 for 177 rulings, and 369/89 
Provincia di Bolzano, [1990] Diritto Comunitario e degli scambi intemazionali 395, for 169 
rulings.
49 64/90 referendum on pesticides [1990] Diritto Comunitario e degli scambi 
intemazionali 445, [1991] RTDE 296.




























































































valve. Federico Sorrentino has recently shown51 that this represents a sign of 
a situation in which notwithstanding the supremacy of Community law (which 
in the formal traditional analysis would mean that sovereignty has passed from 
the State to the Community) the final decision in critical cases ("exceptional 
cases" to use C. Schimitt terminology used by Sorrentino) remains with the 
State.
All these cases could be considered logical developments of Granital. 
Even if the Constitutional Court does not accept supremacy in Simmenthal 
terms, the system works as if supremacy was there. Pre-emption makes the 
sphere of competence of the Community flexible. Hence whenever there is a 
rule of Community law it is applied despite the conflicting national provisions.
In the early post -Granital cases, in particular, the Constitutional Court has 
been very careful in sending to lower courts the message that the control of 
legislation against Community law should be decentralized. To do so the 
Constitutional Court discarded even cases in which the clash with Community 
law was not the only ground of unconstitutionality.52
What one may regret is the refusal of the Court to make 177 references. 
The Court recognized that it had a faculty to make references for preliminary 
rulings to the Court of Justice in Giampaoli,53 but it did not make use of it. 
Previously54 the Constitutional Court sent a case for which a 177 was needed 
back to the judge who made the Constitutional reference telling him to make a 
reference to Luxembourg. This made things in practice very difficult but the 
Constitutional Court was not flagrantly violating article 177.
One might have thought that the Constitutional Court was not a national 
court within the meaning of article 177. The acknowledgment by the 
Constitutional Court that it is entitled to make references to the Court of Justice 
makes it impossible for the Constitutional Court not to be considered a ’court 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy’ within the meaning of 
article 177. There might be room for arguing this in relation to constitutional 
review proceedings upon reference, in which the ruling is only an "incidente" 
of other proceedings. It is clear however that the Constitutional Court is acting 
as a supreme administrative court in cases of conflict between State and 
Regions. In these cases the Court gives a ruling without appeal at the end of a
51 "La Costituzione Italiana di fronte al processo di Integrazione Europea” [1992] 
Quaderni Regionali, 417.
52 This is very clear in case 113/85 BECA, [1985] Giurisprudenza Italiana, 388.
53 18/4/91 n.168 [1992] Foro It. I 660, with note Daniele.





























































































No other Constitutional Court makes 177 references, but Giampaoli was 
meant to be a Community friendly move and ended up by being a blatant 
violation of the Treaty.
b) There is a second line of cases, particularly very minor ones, in which the 
Community law issues are sometimes not fully appreciated.
The Constitutional Court sometimes showed itself to be careless. In case 
286/86 Pulos55 while quoting Granital, the Court checked the conformity of 
Italian legislation with Community law, in a pure pre-Granital fashion. The case 
did not seem to fall under the reservation made for legislation affecting to the 
core principles of the Treaties.
Another example is case 172/89 Soldo56 where they seem to say that 
external commercial policy is outside of the scope of the EC competence.
What is particularly striking in this line of cases is the wording of the 
Constitutional Court’s dicta. At times they are completely at variance with 
Granital. L. Daniele57 notes that "De tels passages sont peut-être le signal 
d’une certaine fatigue intellectuelle de la part de la cour vis-à-vis d’une vision 
somme toute artificielle et pourtant difficile à maîtriser.."
c) Finally there are the cases in which Granital simply does not work. In 
particular the Constitutional Court is not satisfied with decentralized control in 
many cases.
In an impressive line of decisions58 on regional legislation in breach of 
a Community directive the Constitutional Court went on to rule on the issue 
itself rather than sending the case to the referring judges according to the 
Granital orthodoxy. It has been argued that the directive did not have direct 
effect. It might be true. Nonetheless it remains an whole area of law in which 
legislation in breach of Community law needs to be declared unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court rather than being disapplied.
55 [1987] Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 2309.
56 Order 172/89 Cantieri Nautici Soldo [1989] Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 806.
51 Après l’arrêt Granitoi.." [1992] Cahier de Droit Européen, 3.
58 n° 14/91 Incampo, n° 117/91 Edino Jancovits; n° 213/91 Benedetti and other, n° 307/91 





























































































THE PROBLEM OF COMPETENCE
I tried to show in section 2 that the framework of the doctrines of the 
Constitutional Court is the concept of ’Competence’. The Court does not 
necessarily use this word but it refers to the idea of competence. Since ’the 
separate legal orbits’ of San Michele the basic idea is that each legal order has 
its sphere of competence and cannot interfere with the other legal order.
In Frontini it is said that the distribution of these competences is 
established by the Treaty. The Constitutional Court has not built upon this, as 
it was more concerned with material limits to Community intervention. The fact 
that in Frontini the material limit of human rights was framed in terms of 
competence has probably misplaced the question.
In Frontini the Court apparently considered that should the Treaty be 
interpreted by the Community Institutions as giving power to violate human 
rights it would be deprived of its effect in Italy. In the case of Fragd the 
Constitutional Court has applied for the first and only time this doctrine. If one 
looks more carefully one can even spot a further variation on the theme. One 
might have thought that a community act violating human rights would be - 
according to Frontini- beyond the scope of the Treaty and hence beyond the 
scope of article 11 of the Constitution being the fruit of an ’aberrant’ 
interpretation of the Treaty. In Fragd in order to put its power of control into 
practice the Constitutional Court had to bend once again its own doctrine. In 
order to have a peg on which to hang its reprobation of a doctrine of the Court 
of Justice it had to decide whether article 177, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice, fell under article 11 of the Constitution and not whether the ’aberrant’ 
ECJ case law on temporal effects of preliminary rulings fell under article 177 
of the Treaty.
In the wake of the German decision on Maastricht, can one expect the 
Court to control the legality of Community acts allegedly beyond Community 
competence, as established by the Treaty, but not contrary to a material rule 
deriving from the Italian constitutional order? The influence of the German 
model should never be underestimated.59 There is nonetheless a big procedural 
problem. The Constitutional Court, according to its dualist model, can review 
only the statute implementing the Treaty. In other words it can review only 
Treaty articles and acts adopted on the basis thereof. The Constitutional Court 
in order to check the conformity with human rights of a regulation would
59 Sorrentino has immediately drawn the attention on the implications for Italy of the 
approach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. "Ai limiti dell’integrazione europea: primato delle 
fonti o delle istituzioni comunitarie?" [1994] Politica del diritto 189 also in Scintillae luris- 




























































































actually assess the legality of art. 189 of the Treaty in as much as it granted to 
the Council the power to enact the contested regulation. This is precisely what 
happened in Fragd.
This type of review procedure can not work for ultra vires acts. To say 
that an act is beyond the competence of the Community means that it was not 
taken on the basis of the Treaty. The Constitutional Court would not find 
anything in the statute implementing the Treaty to be declared contrary to the 
Constitution.
Only decentralized control by every court could be possible in relation to 
ultra vires acts. It does not seem very likely that the Court would accept to have 
lower judges checking the legality of Community acts.
One can accept that under the dualist model of the Constitutional Court 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is for the national courts, but should the Constitutional 
Court decide to exercise the control over competence, it will be blocked by a 
procedural deadlock.
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court will try to control even 
Community acts ultra vires according to the material criteria set out in Frontini 
and Granital.
The Constitutional Court took upon itself in the eighties to overcome the 
doctrinal and philosophical barriers concerning the recognition of supremacy. 
There were several reasons for this. Certainly the Constitutional Court did not 
want to remain the arrière-garde of the world of lawyers in Europe. On top of 
that, the Court realized the necessity to grant effectivity to a legal system, the 
one of Community law, which, largely due to the inefficiency of the Italian 
administration, was not giving to Italian citizens and economic operators the 
rights to which they were entitled to.
The changing of the political inclination towards the Community together 
with a more realistic appreciation of the process of European Integration, which 
is no longer considered as some kind of providential source of rights for the 
citizens and efficiency for the administration, as well as the coming of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to positions that recall a traditional legalistic 
perception of the process of European integration -which the Corte 
Costituzionale has never definitely abandoned- may lead to the development of 
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